There has been major buzz surrounding influenza research, specifically concerning H5N1. Two scientists have been under heavy media and bureaucratic scrutiny regarding the possibility that their research could lead to adverse health repercussions worldwide. The two scientists involved are Dr. Ron Fouchier at the Erasmus Medical Centre from the Netherlands, who seems to understand that the only bad publicity is no publicity at all, and Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the School of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who is never around to answer questions. As a result, no one really knows what is going with their studies, and could someone please publish their observations already.
The media horror is so widespread that an article from MedicalXpress decided to compare the situation to a 1977 outbreak of influenza thought to have originated as a lab strain escapee. This was never proven to be true, and never reached a pandemic as this article insinuates. To make matters more dramatic, many are scared that the research could also be used for bioterrorism, with some even suggesting that H5N1 is worse than Anthrax itself. This is interesting, because though H5N1 has had documented cases of mortality, it is known not to be transmissible to humans, thankfully. Furthermore, to conclude that the newly produced Fouchier H5N1 virus will be lethal to humans because it is transmissible in ferrets is incredibly far fetched. An example is the recent 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus, which was of concern in ferrets but had significantly low mortality rates in humans, despite how easily it spread. Moreover, H1N1 is not the only flu strain to cause different effects in ferrets and humans.
What the media has compiled thus far is that Dr. Kawaoka’s and Dr. Fouchier’s studies are similar to each other, or have reached similar conclusions separately, for which they have been under scrutiny from the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). Eventually, both authors agreed upon a 60-day moratorium, during which discussion of the purpose and goals of this research was to follow, allowing the scientific community to decide whether the studies are harmful to the human population or beneficial to the advancement of influenza research.
Here is what the public has been made aware of with regards to Dr. Fouchier’s research. According to an interview with ScienceInsider, Dr. Fouchier wanted to determine what it would take for H5N1 to become widespread. To do this, he let the H5N1 virus accumulate mutations slowly through its passage in ferrets. Dr. Fouchier went on to point out that ferrets are perfect models for influenza transmission since all influenza stains that make ferrets sick have made us sick as well. He goes on to state that the generated virus is “probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make”, as quoted by ScienceInsider. Whether it is the media that is blowing this out of proportion or Dr. Fouchier getting a kick out of it, we might never know. Thankfully, Science has hinted at the possibility that the journal might publish the Fouchier data once and for all so that we can all finally consume the paper instead of watching the ball swing back and forth.
It is important to point out that this is not the first time people have overreacted, and it will not be the last – that is, as long as America lags behind in education. Just recently, the media whirlpool revolved around what was thought to be a newly discovered retrovirus of the likes of HIV, called XMRV, which was linked to prostate cancer and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), a debilitating illness with no definitive cause. Panic ensued and American and Canadian Blood Services banned CFS sufferers from donating blood before a link to the disease was even established, and all this even though scientists worldwide were still using XMRV in their fumehoods as a level 2 pathogen! It is lucky that XMRV was found to be a laboratory contaminant obtained through passaging xenografts in nude mice, and that studies showed that XMRV could not even overcome the action of intrinsic factors like the human APOBEC3G protein and tetherin to name two, and thus it was unlikely that it would further bypass the immune response.
To beware of causing harm is a mandate scientists should follow, but to supress scientific exploration is to deny the possibility of progress in therapeutics and most of all, in understanding. Scientists should also note the importance of how to deliver delicate information to the media as the press interpretation of results often leads to mass-spread panic.
*At the time of posting, Dr. Fouchier presented results that indicate the virus would actually not be as dangerous to humans, as previously suggested. This further strengthens the notion that the media is a force to be reckon with and research can be taken out of context. If you are interested in following up with Dr. Fouchier’s data, please read Dr. Rancaniello’s “Influenza H5N1 is not lethal in ferrets after airborne transmission” at http://www.virology.ws/2012/03/01/influenza-h5n1-is-not-lethal-in-ferrets-after-airborne-transmission/.
References:
1. Rancaniello V. http://www.virology.ws/tag/h5n1/
2. Enserink M. 2011. Scientists Brace for Media Store Around Controversial Flu Studies. ScienceInsider. http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2011/11/scientists-brace-for-media-storm.html
3. Walker D and Herzog K. 2011. Avian flu breakthrough raises question of potential risk. Disease, Conditions, Syndromes. MedicalXpress. http://medicalxpress.com/news/2011-12-avian-flu-breakthrough-potential.html
4. Van-Tam, J and Sellwood, C (editors). 2010. Chapter 4: A Brief History and Epidemiological Features of Pandemic Influenza edited by C. Sellwood. Introduction to Pandemic Influenza. CAB International. Cambridge.
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